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"The protection of the innocent is paramount in a
criminal justice system whose ideology and rules are
predicated on the belief that there can be no worse1 harm than
wrongful conviction and incarceration."

I. INTRODUCTION

For police and prosecutors, a confession is a beautiful thing.

At trial, admitting a

confession into evidence can render other evidence of guilt "superfluous." 2 Because confessions
are so valuable to the prosecution at trial, the police will do anything-and everything-within
the parameters of the law to get one.3 As long as the police inform a suspect in custody of his
right to remain silent and his right to an attorney, 4 and the suspect waives those rights, as many
do, 5 the police are permitted to employ a number of techniques to convince a suspect that
confessing is in his best interest. 6 Police may lead a suspect to believe that they have evidence of
the suspect's guilt,7 including DNA evidence linking the suspect to the crime.8

1Richard J. Ofshe & Richard A. Leo, The Decision to Confess Falsely. Rational Choice and IrrationalAction, 74
DENY. U. L. REV. 979, 1122 (1997).
2

Paul Marcus, It's Not Just About Miranda: Determining the Voluntariness of Confessions in Criminal

Prosecutions, 40 VAL. U. L. REv. 601, 601 (2006) (quoting Saul M. Kassin, The Psychology of Confession
Evidence, 52 AM. PSYCHOL. 221 (1997)).
3 See Patrick M. McMullen, Comment, Questioning the Questions: The Impermissibility of Police Deception in

Interrogationsof Juveniles, 99 Nw. U. L. REv. 971, 971-72 (2005) ("In every criminal investigation, acquiring a
confession is the top priority of the police.").
4 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79 (1966).
5 See infra note 84 and accompanying text.
6

See, e.g., Welsh S. White, Miranda's Failure to Restrain PerniciousInterrogationPractices, 99 MICH. L. REV.

1211 (2001) (describing permissible interrogation methods); Deborah Young, Unnecessary Evil: Police Lying in
Interrogations,28 CONN. L. REv. 425, 427-28 (1996).
7 See, e.g., Fraizer v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740 (1969) (holding that the police officer's misrepresentation of the co-

defendant's statement does not render the petitioner's confession involuntary); Morgan v. Zant, 743 F.2d 775, 779
(11 th Cir. 1984) (upholding conviction of defendant who confessed after police falsely told him that his footprints
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Although the use of deceptive methods in police interrogations can help secure a
conviction of the factually guilty, these tactics have dangerous implications for the factually
innocent. Police interrogation is inherently coercive, 9 and the methods used by police can result
in false confessions. 10 Such false confessions cause serious problems within the criminal justice
system. First, and most obviously, an innocent person stands to be punished for a crime they did
not commit. Just as disturbingly, the true perpetrator remains free to re-offend, and the discovery
of a false confession negatively impacts the integrity of the criminal justice system itself.11
While the frequency of false confessions has not been firmly established, a summary of four
major studies suggests that false confessions are the number one cause of wrongful convictions,
accounting for fourteen to twenty-five percent of such cases. 12 Regardless of the exact number
of false confessions, in a system that is based on accuracy and justice-particularly when that
system allows for the death penalty-even one wrongful conviction based on a false confession
is cause for concern.
were found at the crime scene); Lewis v. United States, 74 F.2d 173, 179 (9th Cir. 1934) (finding defendant's
confession admissible where police faked a photograph depicting the defendant's thumb print on the victim's shoe).
8 See e.g., United States v. Chee, No. 2:05 CR 733, 2006 U.S. Dist. Lexis 57122, at *4-6, *12-13 (D. Utah Aug. 15,
2006) (finding confession voluntary where officers falsely indicated they had recovered suspect's DNA at the
scene); Jason Borenstein, DNA in the Legal System: The Benefits are Clear, the Problems Aren't Always, 3
CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHICS J. 847, 851 (interpreting State v. Chirokovskcic, 860 A.2d 986, 990-91 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004)).
9 The

United States Supreme Court recognized the inherently coercive nature of police interrogation in Mirandav.

Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 448 (1966).
10

For example, over twenty-five percent of the individuals exonerated by DNA evidence by the Innocence Project

were originally wrongfully convicted by, in part, a false confession. The Innocence Project, Understand the Causes:
False Confessions, http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/False-Confessions.php (last visited March 25,
2008).
11 See infra notes 120-24 and accompanying text..
12

Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the Post-DNA World, 82 N.C. L. REv.

891, 907 (2004); see Paul G. Cassell, Protecting the Innocentfrom False Confessions and Lost Confessions - and
From Miranda, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 497, 520 (1998) (estimating the number of wrongful conviction
resulting from police induced false confessions at anywhere from 10 to 394 a year).
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Although the reasons why false confessions occur are not fully understood, it is clear that
in the majority of cases, suspects falsely confess because they feel they have no choice. 13

In

other words, false confessions are usually involuntary. 14 In evaluating whether a confession is
voluntary, and thus admissible against the defendant at trial, the United States Supreme Court
uses a totality of the circumstances test.1 5 The Court looks at a variety of factors, including
characteristics of the defendant, promises of leniency made by the police, and the length of the
detention. 16 Because these suspects confess after they have waived their Miranda rights, it is
difficult to establish that a confession is involuntary absent the use or threat of physical
violence. 17
In recognition of these problems, scholars have offered a variety of reforms that seek to
reduce the number of false confessions. Some argue that any statement made by a suspect to the
police while in custody is essentially compelled and therefore should be inadmissible. 18 Others

See Welsh S. White, False Confessions and the Constitution: Safeguards Against Untrustworthy Confessions, 32
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 105, 146 (1997) ("When an interrogator deceives a suspect as to the nature of the evidence
against him, falsely leading him to believe that the police have overwhelming evidence of his guilt, the suspect is
likely to give an untrustworthy confession.").
13

14

There are, however, very rare instances in which a false confession is voluntary. See, e.g., Hugo Adam Bedau &

Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriagesof.Justice in Potentially CapitalCases, 40 STAN. L. REv. 21, 63 (1987) (recalling
an instance where the defendant falsely confessed as ajoke).
15

See discussion infra Part II.

See Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 600-01 (1948) (noting the defendant's age and the number of hours he was
interrogated by the police); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 332 U.S. 143, 153 (1944) (detailing the circumstances
surrounding the defendant's confession, including the fact that the defendant was questioned, without sleep, for
nearly thirty-six hours).
16

17

See White, supranote 13, at 117.

18

See Irene Merker Rosenberg & Yale L. Rosenberg, A Modest Proposalfor the Abolition of Custodial Confessions,

68 N.C. L. REv. 69, 109-110 (1990) (arguing that because custody in and of itself is coercive, the addition of
questioning deprives suspects of the ability to make a free choice).
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seek nationwide adoption of the Alaska 19 and Minnesota 2° requirements that all interrogations be
22
tape recorded. 21 More innovative approaches from false confessions expert Richard A. Leo

and Innocence Project co-founder Peter J. Neufeld 23 argue for the creation of a Daubert-like
admissibility determination, 24 where judges act as gatekeepers responsible for excluding
untrustworthy confessions. 25 There are also proposals for a per se ban of police deception during

19

In 1985, the Supreme Court of Alaska held that a statement made by a suspect during a police integration is

inadmissible unless the police recorded both the confession and the interrogation preceding it. Stephan v. State, 711
P.2d 1156 (Alaska 1985). The court considered the recording requirement part of due process and necessary to
insure that the suspect's right to counsel, right against self-incrimination, and right to a fair trial are not violated. Id.
at 1159-60. The court also sought to prevent false confessions. Id. at 1161. Similarly, the Texas legislature adopted
a requirement that a confession must be recorded in order to be admissible at trial. TEX. CODE OF CRim. PROC. ANN.
art.38.22(3) (Vernon 1996). However, the Texas statute does not require the interrogation leading up to confession
be recorded. See id. See Gail Johnson, False Confessions and Fundamental Fairness: The Need for Electronic
Recording of CustodialInterrogations,6 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 719, 745-49 & n.199-202 (1997) for a discussion and
explanation of the ways other state courts have dealt with the practice of recording.
20

The Supreme Court of Minnesota held in State v. Scales that interrogations must be recorded in order to "ensure

the fair administration ofjustice" rather than on the basis of due process. 518 N.W.2d 587, 592 (Minn. 1994),
21

See Johnson, supra note 19 at 721 (arguing that interrogations and confessions should be recorded in order to

prevent false confessions and subsequent wrongful convictions); Wayne T. Westling, Something Is Rotten in the
InterrogationRoom: Let's Try Video Oversight, 34 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 537, 547-55 (2001) (advocating for the
recording of the entire custodial interrogation). Specifically, Westling argues that, "[E]lectronically recording
custodial interrogations promotes the goals of truth-finding, fair treatment, and accountability in the legal process.
By creating an objective and reviewable record of police questioning, we further the policy objectives that underlie
our dual concerns for crime control and due process." Id. at 553. See also Heath S. Berger, Let's Go to the
Videotape: A Proposal to Legislate Videotaping of Confessions, 3 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 165, 166-69 (1993)
(describing the advantages and disadvantages of videotaping confessions and concluding that videotaping will
regulate police conduct and aid the fact finder at trial).
22

Professor Leo has written extensively on interrogation methods, false confessions, and wrongful convictions,

often in collaboration with Richard J. Ofshe. Their publications are cited throughout this Article.
23

The Innocence Project was founded at Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law by Barry C. Scheck and Peter J.

Neufeld in 1992. The Innocence Project, About the Innocence Project, http://www.innocenceproject.org/about (last
visited March 25, 2008).
See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993); see also Kuhmo Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526
U.S. 137 (1999); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997). In these three decisions, the Supreme Court
instructed judges to act as "gatekeepers" by screening expert testimony for relevance and reliability. The standards
created in these cases were later incorporated into the Federal Rules of Evidence. See FED. R. EvID. 702.
24

25

See Richard A. Leo et al., BringingReliability Back In: False Confessions and Legal Safeguards in the Twenty-

First Century, 2006 Wis. L. REV. 479, 520-536 (2006); see also Sharon L. Davies, The Reality ofFalse Confessions
- - Lessons of the Central Park Jogger Case, 30 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 209, 231-252 (explaining and
defending a proposal for trial court assessment of the reliability of confessions).
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interrogations, 26 either through legislative 27 or judicial regulation. 28 Finally, some believe that
the voluntariness test itself should be revamped to prohibit interrogation methods that are
29
substantially likely to induce false confessions.

These reform proposals have been met with vehement criticism, 30 most of which stem
from a concern that any attempt to prohibit or regulate deceptive interrogation methods would
31
decrease the number of confessions and convictions produced by the criminal justice system.

With these concerns in mind, this article proposes a different, more moderate reform: a per se
ban on the falsification of DNA evidence during police interrogations. This proposal differs from
those described above in three important ways. First, the prohibition on fabricating DNA
26 See Young, supra note 6, at 476 (suggesting that police departments continue the practice of interrogation but

prohibit lying in interrogations by administrative regulations); see also McMullen, supra note 3, at 1005
(concluding that "a per se bar on deception in the interrogation of juveniles is the only constitutionally and morally
defensible rule.").
27 See Miriam S. Gohara, A Lie for a Lie: False Confessions and the Case for Reconsidering the Legality of
Deceptive Interrogation Techniques, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 791, 835 (2006) (proposing that "legislators should
pass statutes outlawing law enforcement misrepresentations about incriminating evidence and interrogations and
limiting the use of trickery during custodial questioning.").
21 See Laura Hoffman Roppe, Comment, True Blue? Whether Police Should Be Allowed to Use Trickery and
Deception to Extract Confessions, 31 SAN. DIEGO L. REv. 729, 771-72 (1994).
29 See White, supra note 6, at 1232-47 (describing interrogation methods such as threats of punishment, promises of
leniency, threats of adverse consequences to a friend or loved one, and misrepresentation of the evidence against the
suspect). Cf Mark A. Godsey, Rethinking the Involuntary Confession Rule: Toward a Workable Test for Identifying
Compelled Self-Incrimination, 93 CAL. L. REv. 465, 515-540 (2005). Godsey's "objective penalties test" would fmd
confessions inadmissible where the police "impose a penalty on a suspect during an interrogation to punish silence
or provoke speech" because such penalties would constitute compulsion and violate the self-incrimination clause of
the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 516.
30

See Cassell, supra note 12, at 498 ("The [suggestions] ... appear to provide an incomplete justification for the

policy measures they endorse because, in protecting the innocent, the analysis cannot focus exclusively on false
confessions. The innocent are at risk not only when police extract untruthful confessions--the false confession
problem--but also when police fail to obtain truthful confessions from criminals--the lost confession problem.").
Cassell, Leo, and Ofshe frequently criticize and respond to each others work. For an example of this exchange, see
Richard A. Leo & Richard L. Ofshe, Using the Innocent to Scapegoat Miranda: Another Reply to Paul Cassell, 88 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 557 (1998).
31 See Laurie Magid, Deceptive Police InterrogationPractices: How Far is Too Far?, 99 MICH. L. REv. 1168,
1171-72 (2001) (concluding that existing evidence of false confessions does not justify limiting deceptive methods
in police interrogations because such limitations would impose significant costs on society by reducing the number
of confessions and convictions of guilty persons).
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evidence does not require a change in the voluntariness test used to ascertain the admissibility of
a confession.

Rather, it fits within current confession law jurisprudence, allowing for easy

adoption by state and federal courts, and police departments. Second, the proposal is limited to
DNA evidence. It does not include other forensic evidence, such as ballistics, fingerprinting, or
blood typing. Instead, it focuses on DNA because of the public perception of DNA infallibility.
Finally, the proposal establishes a bright-line rule. Scholars have long complained about the
ambiguity of a totality of the circumstances test, which fails to give guidance to lower courts or
law enforcement officers, who arguably need it most. 32 Instead, the proposal advocates for a
complete prohibition on any interrogation technique designed to convince the suspect that the
police have obtained his DNA in connection with the crime. Though more moderate than other
reform proposals, it shares one significant similarity: it seeks to increase the fundamental fairness
of police interrogation, and to prevent false confessions and wrongful convictions. In short, this
article proposes a small step in the right direction.
Part II of this article traces the development of the due process voluntariness test for
admissibility of confessions, summarizing the law on confession admissibility. Part III describes
current police interrogation techniques, focusing on the Reid Method and its likelihood of
resulting in false confessions. Part IV turns to the influence of television on the public
understanding of law, forensic science, and the use of DNA evidence in law enforcement,
arguing that the so-called "CSI Effect" creates a public perception that DNA evidence is
incontrovertible. Part IV concludes that the public perception of the strength of DNA evidence
tips the balance of the totality of the circumstances test, such that a confession elicited based
upon fabrication of DNA evidence in an interrogation cannot be seen as voluntary. Finally, Part
32

Godsey, supra note 29, at 640; see Charles H. Whitehead, The Burger Court's Counter-Revolution in Criminal

Procedure: The Recent Criminal Decisions of the United States Supreme Court, 24 WASHBURN L. J. 471, 472-73
(1985) (explaining the importance of clear guidance for law enforcement officers).
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V sets forth the proposal that confessions based on deception regarding DNA evidence be
excluded, justifying the proposal under existing law and briefly considering likely criticisms.
II. CONFESSION LAW: VOLUNTARINESS AND THE TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES TEST

The Supreme Court has used a number of different tests to determine the admissibility of
confessions. 33 What began as a common law doctrine of voluntariness 34 moved from the Fifth
Amendment's right against self incrimination 35 to the Fourteenth Amendment's right to due
process36 and back.37 The Court's landmark decision in Miranda v. Arizona was, in part, an
attempt to harmonize the federal and state law of confession admissibility. 38 However, the
jurisprudence in this area has largely returned to where it began, at a consideration of the totality
39
of the circumstances surrounding the confession.

A.

The Pre-MirandaAnalysis of Confession Admissibility

See Steven Penney, Theories of Confession Admissibility: A Historical View, 25 AM. J. CRIM. L. 309 (1998) for a
historical account of the developments of confession law.
33

34 See Leo et al., supra note 25, at 488-91 (discussing common law voluntariness).

" The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution reads, in pertinent part, "No person shall.., be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law

. .

." U.S. CONST. amend. V. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Some Kind Words for the PrivilegeAgainst Self-

Incrimination,26 VALPARAISO U. L.R. 311 (1991) (reviewing the history and current scope of the privilege against
self-incrimination); Laurence A. Benner, Requiem For Miranda: The Rehnquist Court's Voluntariness Doctrine in
Historical Perspective, 67 WASH U. L.Q. 59 (1989) (conducting a historical analysis of the right against selfincrimination and its recent application by the Supreme Court).
36

The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that, "No State shall make or enforce any

law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
See generally Catherine Hancock, Due Process Before Miranda, 70 TUL. L. REv. 2195 (1996) (examining the
various methods of due process analysis).
17

38

See Godsey, supra note 29, at 499 (noting that the Supreme Court was dissatisfied with the due process

voluntariness standard and began looking for another doctrine).
39 Id. at 508.

("[T]he voluntariness test continues to serve as the rule in cases where Miranda warnings are not
required; as the doctrine underlying and justifying the Miranda warnings themselves; and, more importantly, as the
only check on police conduct in the high percentage of interrogations where Miranda warnings have been provided
and waived.").
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The Supreme Court decided its first case regarding the admissibility of a confession in
1884.40 Finding the confession voluntary and admissible, Justice Harlan borrowed from English
precedent:
[T]he presumption upon which weight is given to such evidence, namely, that
one who is innocent will not imperil his safety or prejudice his interests by an
untrue statement, ceases when the confession appears to have been made either in
consequence of inducements of a temporal nature ... or because of a threat or
promise by or in the presence of such person, which, operating upon the fears or
hopes of the accused, in reference to the charge, deprive him of that freedom of
will or self-control essential to make his confession voluntary within the meaning
of the law.4 '

The Court thus adopted the common law voluntariness standard where the only concern is the
42
reliability of the statement.

In Brain v. United States,43 the Court incorporated the voluntariness standard of the Fifth
Amendment, explaining that the Fifth Amendment was "but a crystallization of the doctrine as to
confessions." 44 The majority went on to explain that "a confession, in order to be admissible,
must be free and voluntary; that is, must not be extracted by any sort of threats or violence, nor
obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight, nor by the exertion of any improper
influence." 45 Although Bram remains good law, courts have not strictly interpreted Justice

40

Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574 (1884).

411d. at 585.
42

Id. The Court continued to use this standard in three subsequent cases. See Pierce v. United States, 160 U.S. 355,

357 (1896); Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613, 623-24 (1896), Sparfv. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 55 (1895).
43

Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897).

44ld. at

41

543.

Id. at 542-43 (internal citation omitted).
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For example, the Court in Arizona v.

Fulminante47 expressly stated that the Brain decision's language on government promises and
leniency "does not state the standard for determining . . . voluntariness." 4 8 Instead, courts

consider inducements as one factor in the totality of the circumstances analysis and do not
49
impose a per se ban on threats or promises.

In 1936, the Court used the Fourteenth Amendment to invalidate confessions that were
obtained after police brutally beat and tortured three African-American men in the seminal case
of Brown v. Mississippi.50 The police hung one suspect by a rope to the limb of a tree almost to
the point of strangulation, released him, and then hung him up again until he confessed. 51 The
rope burns on his neck were still visible at trial.52 The others were made to strip naked, and were
beaten with a leather strap with buckles on it.53 At trial, one of the deputies admitted to the
whipping but stated that it was, "Not too much for a negro; not as much as I would have done if
it were left to me." 54 In Brown, the Court focused on the circumstances in which the confessions
were given, stating, "It would be difficult to conceive of methods more revolting to the sense of
justice than those taken to procure the confessions of these petitioners, and the use of the
46

See Welsh S. White, Confessions Induced by Broken Government Promises, 43 DUKE L.J. 947 (1994)

(considering the admissibility of confessions induced by broken promises of leniency).
47

Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991).

48

1d.at 285.

49 Marcus, supra note 2, at 606-07.
50 Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
51

Id at 281.

52 Id.
53

Id.at 282.

54

Id.at 284.
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confessions thus obtained as the basis for conviction and sentence was a clear denial of due
process. 55 Although the Court maintained the totality of the circumstances approach, Brown
drew a bright-line rule banning physical coercion in interrogations. 56 Aside from torture and
physical coercion, there are currently no other factors that automatically deem a confession
inadmissible; there are no other bright-lines.
In applying the voluntariness test, the Court primarily asks whether the suspect's "will
was overborne by official pressure." 57 Significantly, the Court has, over the years, moved away
from a reliability-centered approach to one that is more concerned with the behavior of the
interrogating officials and characteristics of the suspect. 58 Citing the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Court stated in 1961:
Our decisions.., have made [it] clear that.., confessions which are involuntary
... cannot stand. This is not so because such confessions are unlikely to be true
but because the methods used to extract them offend an underlying principle in
the enforcement of our criminal law: that ours is an accusatorial and not an
inquisitorial system-a system in which the State must establish guilt by
evidence independently and freely secured and may not by coercion prove its
charge against an accused out of his own mouth.59
Thus, the Court held that confessions could be excluded from evidence for reasons aside from
their veracity and that the exclusion of confessions could also be used to deter improper police
conduct.

55

60

Id.at 286.

56

See id.

57

Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 323 (1959).

58

Id. at 320 ("The abhorrence of society to the use of involuntary confessions does not turn alone on their inherent

untrustworthiness. It also turns on the deep-rooted feeling that police must obey the law while enforcing the law.").
59

Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 540-41 (1961).

60

id.
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Over time, the totality of the circumstances test proved difficult to apply. 6 1 By the 1960s
the Court had identified some thirty factors as relevant under the totality of the circumstances
test, none of which were determinative, except the prohibition of physical violence. 6' As a
result, the totality of the circumstances test failed to provide guidance to police and judges
aline. 63 The Supreme Court was in need of a rule.
B.

Miranda and the Post-MirandaAnalysis of Confession Admissibility
Miranda v. Arizona was the solution to the "everything relevant, nothing determinative"

problem of the due process voluntariness test. The Supreme Court recognized the ambiguity of
the totality of the circumstances test and sought to establish a new doctrine that would simplify
the application of confession law for both lower courts and law enforcement. 64 In Miranda v.
Arizona,65 the Court recognized that police interrogation is inherently coercive

66

and proscribed

four warnings designed to counteract that coercion. 67 Police interrogating a suspect in custody
must warn the suspect that: (1) he has the right to remain silent; (2) anything he say may be used
against him in a court of law; (3) he has the right to an attorney; and (4) if he can not afford an
attorney, one will be provided for him. 68 In Miranda,the Court set forth a bright-line rule: the

61 Marcus, supra note 2, 638-43.
62

CriminalJustice: Concern About Confessions, TIME, Apr. 29, 1966, at 57.

See id.; see also Roppe, supra note 28, at 742 (noting that the ambiguity of the test failed to provide guidance for
lower courts and police interrogators).
63

64 See Godsey, supranote 29, at 499.
65

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

66

See id. at 448. The Court stated that even absent physical force, "the very fact of custodial interrogation exacts a

heavy toll on individual liberty and trades on the weaknesses of individuals." Id. at 455.
67

Id. at 478-79.

68 id
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government may not use confessions obtained through compulsion, where compulsion is defined
69
as custodial interrogation without the proscribed warnings to offset any coercion.

Despite the Court's adoption of a bright-line rule of admissibility for confessions in
Miranda,the totality of the circumstances voluntariness inquiry remains critical to determining
the admissibility of post-Mirandaconfessions. 70 Courts still consider factors such as the age of
the defendant, 71 the circumstances surrounding the waiver or interrogation,72 and the defendant's
mental health.73 As with other interrogation methods, police deception is permissible as long as
it does not overbear the defendant's will. 74 The totality of the circumstances test, with all its
failings, was back. As one scholar put it, "[w]ith such a rich assortment of considerations, it
75
appears impossible to suggest just what rule [a] case stands for under the Due Process Clause."

Once again, lower courts and law enforcement are left with little guidance and lots of flexibility
to admit a confession absent a clear indication that police action overcame the defendant's free
will.

76

III.
A.

POLICE INTERROGATION METHODS AND THE REALITY OF FALSE CONFESSIONS

InterrogationMethods

467, 478-79

69

1d.at 458,

70

Godsey, supra note 29, at 508.

71

Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 600-01 (1948).

72

Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 153 (1944).

73Jackson
74

See Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 739 (1969).

75Marcus,
76

v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 371-72 (1964).

supra note 2, at 640.

Id.at 642-44.
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In most cases, the purpose of an interrogation is to obtain a confession or incriminating
statement that can be used against the defendant at some point during the prosecution of that
crime. 77 As one famous interrogation instructor wrote, "[i]n criminal investigations.., there are
many, many instances where physical clues are entirely absent, and the only approach to a
possible solution to the crime is the interrogation of the criminal suspect himself., 78 Police and
prosecutors are aware of the value, and often the necessity, of a self-incriminating statement. For
example, in his study of police interrogation methods, Richard Leo found that "virtually every
detective to whom I spoke insisted that more crimes are solved by police interviews and
interrogations than by any other investigative method., 79

A confession or incriminating

statement can have negative repercussions for the defendant throughout the prosecution.
Specifically, an individual who confesses will likely receive a higher bail, be charged with a
more serious crime, and is less likely to receive a plea bargain. 80 At trial, the jury is likely to
81
weigh a confession more heavily than other evidence of guilt.

There are also instances where the investigator uses an interrogation to rule out a suspect or to clarify guilt or
innocence. The Inbau Manual includes a separate chapter that deals with the interrogation of suspects whose guilt or
77

innocence is doubtful or uncertain. FRED E. INBAU,

CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS

43 (3d ed. 1986).

In these circumstances, the investigator's goal is to make an "initial differentiation between the guilty and the
innocent." Id. at 43. Depending on the investigator's analysis of the suspect's verbal and nonverbal behavior
symptoms of indications of truthfulness and deception, id.,
the investigator may revert to interrogation methods
designed for suspects whose guilt is definite or reasonably certain in the mind of the investigator. Id. at 77.
78

Id.at xiii-xiv. ("[T]he art and science of criminal investigation have not developed to a point where the search for

and the examination of physical evidence will always, or even in most cases, reveal a clue to the identity of the
perpetrator or provide the necessary legal proof of guilt.").

Cassell, supra note 12, at 498 (1998) (quoting Richard A. Leo, Police Interrogation in America: A Study of
Violence, Civility and Social Change 373 (1994) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Univ. of Cal. at Berkeley)).
79

80 See Ofshe & Leo, supra note 1, at 984.
81

id
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Before beginning a custodial interrogation, state and federal law enforcement officers
must advise a suspect of his Miranda rights. 82 Yet, despite the warnings, most suspects waive
these rights, leaving the police free to begin the interrogation. 83 The Miranda warnings actually
make custodial interrogation more treacherous for criminal defendants, because it is difficult for
a suspect to prove that a statement was involuntary after being advised of those rights.
This point is even more forceful given that police have substituted psychological ploys
for physical pressure over the years. Following the Supreme Court's prohibition on physical
abuse or threats of abuse, interrogators turned to psychological methods to convince a suspect to
make an incriminating statement. 84 The Inbau Manual, which promotes the Reid Method of
interrogation, includes a nine-step practice aimed at "appealing to the suspect's common sense
and reasoning rather than to his emotions; [this method] is designed to convince him that his
guilt already is established or that it soon will be established and consequently, there is nothing
else to do but to admit it." 85 Although the manual specifically disapproves of force, threats of
force, or promises of leniency, it does approve of "psychological tactics and techniques as
trickery and deceit that are not only helpful but frequently indispensable in order to secure
incriminating information." 86 Thus, police frequently use deceptive methods, including the
fabrication of evidence, in order to convince a suspect that a conviction is inevitable and that the

12

See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

See White, supra note 6, at 1213. In Richard A. Leo's study, in which he observed police interrogations for over
nine months, he found that the suspect waived their Miranda rights seventy-eight percent of the time. Richard A.
Leo, Inside the InterrogationRoom, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 266, 276 (1996).
13

84

Welsh S. White, Police Trickery in Inducing Confessions, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 581, 581 (1979) ("Use of trickery or

deceit in the questioning of criminal suspects is a staple of current police interrogation practices.").
85 INBAU, supranote 78, at 78.
86 INBAU,

supranote 78, at xiv.
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only way to improve his situation is to confess. 87 As discussed above, because such tactics do
not involve physical coercion and come after the waiver of rights, they do not, without more,
render a confession inadmissible.
B.

88

False Confessions

Unfortunately, false confessions are a reality of the criminal justice system. 89 Despite our
90
common sense disbelief, sometimes a suspect will confess to a crime that he did not commit.

The brutal rape and beating of a female jogger in Central Park is one of the most famous
instances of this phenomenon. 9 1 Shortly after the April 1989 incident, New York City police
obtained confessions from not one, but five young men. 92 Each claimed to have been involved in

87

See Young, supra note 6. As Young explained,

The actual number of cases in which police lie is not known, but there are scores of reported
decisions involving police lying in interrogations. Because most criminal cases are concluded
with guilty pleas and most cases that are tried are not reported, the reported cases of policy lying
represent only a faction of the actual cases in which policy lying occurred. Additionally, police
and police seminars recommend police lying, virtually ensuring that each new police officer is
familiar with the technique.
Id. at 427-28. See also Christopher Slobogin, Deceit, Pretext, and Trickery: Investigative Lies By the Police, 76 OR.
L. REv. 775, 786 - 87 (1997) ("[P]olice believe [deceptive] techniques are necessary to catch criminals ... because
of the suspect's natural reluctance to respond to direct questions and the general prohibition on physically coercive
interrogation practices."). Slobogin describes various methods of police deception and evaluates both the
justifications for and implications of police lying. See id. Margaret Paris's work furthers this discussion and
concludes that all police lying, except when necessary to save lives, should be prohibited. See Margaret L. Paris,
Lying to Ourselves, 76 OR. L. REv. 817, 819 (1997); see also Margaret L. Paris, Trust, Lies, and Interrogation,3
VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 3 (1995) (conducting a policy-oriented analysis of the effects of interrogation lies on the
relationships between individuals and the government).
8' However, deception employed after the suspect has been formally charged is likely to be prohibited by the Sixth

Amendment right to counsel. See Slobogin, supra note 88, at 787 (citing Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201
(1977); Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285 (1969)).
89 See Davies, supra note 25 at 212.
90 See

Leo et al., supranote 25, at 515 (noting that five studies alone have found almost 300 cases of interrogation-

induced false confessions since the 1980s).
91

See Davies, supra note 25, for detailed account of this case, the false confessions of five young men following

police interrogation, and their eventual exoneration. See also Leo et al., supra note 25.
92 See Davies, supra note 25, at 215-16.
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the attack.93 Although their stories were inconsistent, those variations were easily explained at
trial, as it is rare for two people to remember the same event in the same way. 9 4 Moreover, there
were no allegations of extensive physical abuse by the police, and many of the confessions were
recorded.95 According to the judge, each interrogation and confession passed constitutional
muster. 96 Thus, the confessions were admitted and all five young men were sentenced to lengthy
terms in prison. 97 No problem, right? Wrong. We now know for certain that each of the five
defendants was innocent of the crime for which he was convicted.98 DNA tests later confirmed
that the semen left by the attacker was that of Martias Reyes, a serial rapist living in Manhattan
at the time of the attack. 99
1. Causes of False Confessions
It is difficult to rationalize a false confession. In the absence of physical force, or threats
of force, the average person cannot conceive of why an innocent person would confess to a crime
he did not commit, particularly a brutal crime such as rape or murder.100

Analysis of the

interrogation techniques used by police has provided some insight into this arguably irrational

93

Id. at 216.

94

1d. at

219.

95 See Leo et al., supra note 25, at 481.

There were, however, allegations that the police slapped the young men,

yelled at them, and called them liars. Id.
96

See id.

97 See Davies, supra note 25, at 220.
98

See id. at 220.

99

See id. at 220-21 (chronicling Reyes's confession, the confirmation of his involvement in the attack, and the
subsequent exoneration of all five original defendants).

100See Leo et al., supranote 25, at 485 ("Juries tend to discount the possibility of false confessions as unthinkable, if

not impossible. False confessions are viewed as contrary to common sense, irrational, and self-destructive.").
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decision. 10 1 As discussed above, investigators use methods that are designed to manipulate the
suspect's perception of his situation and his evaluation of his choices. 10 2 These methods are
103
successful because people make decisions by balancing and evaluating their alternatives.

The Inbau Manual cautions against using its techniques in a way that could lead to a false
confession. 10 4 Specifically, the Manual instructs interrogators to ask, "Is what I am about to do,
or say, apt to make an innocent person confess?"

10 5

The vast majority of false confessions are

not the result of an officer ignoring this caution and seeking a confession despite evidence of the
suspect's innocence. 10 6 Instead, false confessions are the result of interrogators misusing these
10 7
highly effective methods due to poor training and negligence.

These interrogation techniques are particularly coercive when used against individuals
who are especially vulnerable to pressure. 1°8

Specifically, "[i]ndividuals who are highly

suggestible or highly compliant-all other things being equal-are more likely to confess ...
Mentally handicapped or cognitively impaired individuals, children, juveniles, and the mentally
ill are also unusually vulnerable to police interrogation pressure and are more likely to confess
falsely as a result." 10 9 Psychological studies indicate that when these interrogation methods are

101See

Ofshe & Leo, supranote 1.

102Id. at 985.
103Id. at 985.
104

See

105

Id at 217.

106

See Ofshe & Leo, supranote 1, at 983.

107

See id. at 983, 985.

108

See Leo et al., supranote 25, at 517-19.

INBAU,

supranote 78, at 216.

109 Id. at 517-19.
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used against individuals who are particularly vulnerable to such tactics, one of two types of false
confessions may result: "[C]oerced-complaint false confessions in which a suspect knows he is
confessing falsely but confesses in order to obtain some goal or to escape from a stressful or
intolerable situation, or coerced-internalized false confessions in which a suspect comes to
believe in his own guilt." 110 In either scenario, the suspect believes that the only way to improve
111
his situation is to falsely confess.

2. Frequency of False Confessions
The number of false confessions that have been obtained, or have resulted in a wrongful
conviction, is unknown. 112

There are three reasons for the lack of accurate, empirical

information on this subject. First, there has not been a systematic effort to collect all of the
instances of false confessions, despite numerous studies that have revealed the reasons for and
the frequency of false confessions. 113 Second, ascertaining whether a confession is truly false
can be difficult because there is rarely a consensus as to the facts admitted during a
confession. 114 Moreover, the destruction of valuable evidence can also impair investigation of a
possible false confession and wrongful conviction.115 Third, it is difficult to determine which

110 White, supranote 13, at 109 (internal quotations omitted).
111
See Leo et al., supra note 25, at 517-18; Bedau & Radelet, supra note 14, at 63 (explaining other reasons for
false confessions, including a defendant who falsely confessed to impress his girlfriend, and following his
conviction for murder, falsely confessed to show that a person's false confession would get them convicted of
murder a second time, which it did).
112See

White, supra note 13, at 109 & n.30 (explaining the difficulties in determining the number of false
confessions).
113 See id.
114

See id. at 109 n.30 (citing Richard Ofshe, Inadvertent Hypnosis During Interrogation,40

EXPERIMENTAL HYPNOSIS
115

INT'L J. CLINICAL &

125, 153 (1992)).

See Cynthia E. Jones, Evidence Destroyed, Innocence Lost: The Preservation of Biological Evidence Under

Innocence ProtectionStatutes, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1239 (2005).
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cases of suspected false confessions are actually false because they are not all thoroughly
investigated. 116 However, even if the number of false confessions is not firmly established, two
points are clear: false confessions do occur with surprising frequency 117 and certain interrogation
118
techniques are more likely to lead to false confessions than others.

3. The Costs of False Confessions
Regardless of their infrequency, each false confession is costly in at least three
significant ways.

First, an innocent person is convicted of a crime he did not commit. 119

Second, the true perpetrator of the crime is left free to re-offend. 120 In the Central Park Jogger
case, Martias Reyes assaulted at least five more women, and murdered one, before his eventual
capture in 2002.121 Because five people had (falsely) confessed to the crime, the New York City
Police had no incentive to continue looking for the perpetrator, even when DNA from the victim
did not match any of the (falsely) identified perpetrators. 122 Third, false confessions, and the
wrongful convictions they induce, negatively affect public confidence in law enforcement when
they eventually come to light. In short, "[t]he conviction of innocents erodes the integrity of the
123
justice system along with public confidence in the courts."

116

See White, supra note 13, at 109 n.30.

117

See Davies, supra note 25, at 226 ("[T]he fact that false confessions are obtained in the absence of physical

violence is undeniable.").
118See

supranotes 116-118 and accompanying text.

See Davies, supra note 25, at 220 n.43 (noting that the five young men convicted in the Central Park Jogger case
received sentences ranging from five to fifteen years); see also infra note 126.
119

120

See Leo et al., supranote 25, at 538.

121 Id.

122

See Davies, supra note 25, at 217.

123Id. at

227.
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IV. THE OTHER "CSI EFFECT": THE PUBLIC PERCEPTION OF DNA INFALLIBILITY AND ITS
IMPLICATION FOR POLICE INTERROGATION METHODS

DNA holds a unique place in the criminal justice system. 124 Since 1989, the Innocence

Project has used DNA evidence to clear over 200 individuals sentenced to the death penalty. 125
Both the Project and its co-founders, Barry C. Scheck and Peter J. Neufeld, have sought to
increase public awareness of wrongful convictions and the DNA evidence that can set the
wrongfully convicted free. 126 The advent of DNA technology and forensic science has even

influenced the landscape of television entertainment.

The popular program CSI. Crime Scene

Investigation is centered on the idea that forensic evidence is a silent, and incontrovertible,
witness. 127 According to the show's creator, Anthony E. Zuiker, each episode is based on the
premise that forensic evidence "speaks[s] for those who cannot speak for themselves."

128

Thus,

the public receives messages from both the news media and the entertainment industry that DNA

is an infallible key that can either convict or exonerate.
A.

The Influence of Television

124 See

Jonathan J. Koehler, The Psychology of Numbers in the Courtroom: How to make DNA-Match Statistics
Seem Impressive or Insufficient, 74 S. CAL. L. REv. 1275, 1275 (2001) ("By now, everyone knows that forensic
DNA analysis represents a stunning theoretical advance for the criminal justice system."); see also Borenstein, supra
note 8 (discussing the benefits and problems with DNA evidence, including human fallibility, admissibility, and
weight). The Innocence Project has referred to DNA as a "major factor in changing the criminal justice system."
The Innocence Project, About the Innocence Project, http://www.innocenceproject.org/about (last visited November
22, 2006). For a discussion of the repercussions of post-conviction DNA testing on the criminal justice system, see
also Margaret A. Berger, The Impact of DNA Exonerations on the CriminalJustice System, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS
320 (2006).
The

125

Innocence

Project,

Facts

on

Post-Conviction

DNA

Exonerations,

http://www.innocenceproject.oriContent/351.php (last visited March 25, 2008); see generally Samuel R. Gross et
al., Exonerationsin the UnitedStates 1989 Through 2003, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523 (2005)
The Innocence Project, Mission Statement, http://www.innocenceproject.org/about/Mission-Statement.php

126

(last

visited March 25, 2008).
See Kimberlianne Podlas, "The CSI Effect": Exposing the Media Myth, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA &

127

ENT. L.J. 429, 432 (2006).
12 8

1 d.(quoting VARIETY, Apr. 18-24, 2005 at 9).
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The theory of the "CSI Effect" is based on the notion that television influences a viewer's
understanding of the topic it portrays. 12 9 Simply stated, television affects our perception of
reality. Specifically, television programs influence our perceptions of crime and the legal
13 1
system. 130 The television is a staple of the American home and serves as a powerful educator.

The majority of Americans watch at least twenty-five hours of television per week, 132 allowing
television to become our "primary story-teller, telling most of the stories to most of the people,
most of the time." 133 Thus, television shapes the way that non-lawyers understand the legal
system. 134 Because the majority of Americans are not attorneys, and have never entered a
courtroom, "these pop culture representations obtain an enhanced authority. As these stories of
135
law take root in our psyches, they help to construct our understanding of law and justice."

Not only are people influenced by television, but they are also unable to put aside those
influences in real-life situations. Research in this area has focused primarily on jurors. 136 but
Specifically, studies suggests that
• , * the influence of viewing mass media depictions of the criminal and civil
justice system on later decisionmaking [sic] during trials may persist even when
129 See
130

Podlas, supra note 128, at 443.

See id. ("[L]egal scholars have accepted that television imagery can influence the public's assumptions and

attitudes about the law.").
131

See Podlas, supra note 128, at 444; see also id at 447-451 (explaining the theory of the influence of television)..

132

See id

133

Id. at 445 (quoting Nancy Signorielli, Aging on Television, Messages Relating to Gender, Race, and Occupation

in Prime Time, 48 J. BROAD. & ELECT. MEDIA 279, 279 (2004)).
134 Id at 445.
135

Id.; see Tom R. Tyler, Viewing CSI and the Threshold of Guilt: Managing Truth and Justice in Reality and

Fiction, 115 YALE L.J. 1050, 1084 (2006) (concluding that non-lawyers learn what they know about the law from
the media).
136

See Tyler, supra note 136, at 1061-64. Because jurors are selected from the general public, the research can be

extended to a wider population.
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the legal system makes efforts to limit that influence, either by questioning
potential jurors to the trial or by admonishing
jurors not to take account of these
37
influences when making decisions. 1
When people make legal judgments, or interpret a legal situation, they incorporate the lessons
they have learned from fictional depictions of the law on television, without distinguishing
between factual and fictitious sources of information. 138
B.

CSI and the Power of ForensicScience
In 2004, four years after the debut of CSI, concerns began to emerge regarding the

show's unintended effect on viewers. 139 The "CSI Effect" refers to the three theories regarding
the influence of the television show. The first and most well-known CSI Effect holds that CSI
creates the expectation that all crimes can be solved using forensic evidence. 140 As a result,
jurors are less likely to convict when the prosecution has not put forth some type of scientific
evidence tying the defendant to the crime. 141 The second purported CSI Effect maintains that the
television show has increased lay interest in forensics sciences, causing an increase in criminal

137Id
138

at 1062.

See Podlas, supra note 128, at 446-47 ("[E]ven misinformation about the legal system and crime investigation

can impact the way in which citizens make legal judgments."); Tyler, supra note 136, at 1063 ("Fictional depictions
of crime and the criminal process can and do spill over to shape public views about the nature of crime and
criminals.").
139 See Richard Willing, "CSIEffect" Has Juries Wanting More Evidence, USA TODAY, Aug. 5.2004, at 01A.
140 See

Craig M. Cooley, Reforming the Forensic Science Community to Avert the Ultimate Injustice, 15 STAN. L. &
POL'Y REv. 381, 386-87 (2004) (noting that jurors looking for forensic evidence in each case due to CSI).
141 This

CSI Effect has caused concern in the law enforcement community. For example, Suffolk County District

Attorney Daniel F. Conley stated that jurors are "conditioned to expect forensic science." Editorial, CSI Effect:
Jurors Overestimate Usefulness of DNA Evidence, TELEGRAM & GAZETTE (Worchester, MA), Jan. 8, 2005, at A12.
However, this CSI Effect has yet to be proven by any study or with direct evidence. See Tyler, supra note 134, at
1053 ("While the CSI effect has been widely noted in the popular press, there is little objective evidence
demonstrating that the effect exists.... Lacking any empirical data, discussions of the CSI effect have instead been
based upon the personal impressions of lawyers and legal scholars."). Tyler later concludes that it is plausible that
the CSI Effect influences jurors and their verdicts. Id. at 1084.
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forensics as a career and funding for forensic sciences. 142 This article focus on the third and final
CSI Effect, which refers to how CSI has created a perception that forensic evidence is
infallible. 143
CSI is very accessible to viewers. The show has three spin off versions, airs on over 200
stations,

144

and is seen by an average audience of 26.4 million. 145 It "teaches" viewers not only

about the law but also about forensic science. CST s portrayal of the law and forensic science is
particularly influential because most viewers do not have real-life situations with which to
compare it. 14 6 Specifically, CSI espouses the myth that scientific evidence, including DNA, is
infallible. 147 In the show, forensic science always leads the investigators to the right culprit,
without any question as to their innocence. 148

The show never portrays the reality that,

unbeknownst to most Americans, DNA evidence can be subject to different interpretations, 149 or

142

See Podlas, supra note 128, at 442-43 & n.91 (noting that there are now ninety forensic science programs, some

of which are seeing an increase in the number of applications); see also Willing, supra note 140.
143

Id at 437 ("On its own, scientific evidence can be rather seductive.

In conjunction with CSI, it becomes

insurmountable.").
144

Id. at 432 nn.13-14 (citing VARIETY, Apr. 18-24, 2005 at 14). The spin-offs include CSI: Miami and CSI: NY.

The original version takes place in Las Vegas, Nevada.
145 Id
146

at 432 (citing THE HOLLYWOOD REP., Apr. 20, 2005, at 13).

Id. at 451 ("[B]ecause most viewers have no actual knowledge of this field to displace what they see on TV, the

messages of CSI may exert an enhanced impact.").
147

Id at 437.

148

See id at 437-3 8.

149

Id. at 438; see William C. Thompson, Accepting Lower Standards: The National Research Council's Second

Report on ForensicDNA Evidence, 37 JURIMETRICS J. 405 (1997). Thompson noted,
The procedure for resolving ambiguity ... rests on the subjective judgment of a forensic analyst
who usually knows the suspect's pattern and often is familiar with other evidence in the case
(from the police perspective) through direct communication with detectives. Analysts may
(intentionally or not) be influenced by such information when scoring ambiguous data.
Id. at 412.
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that errors in the laboratories, including human error, may distort the results. 150 As one defense
attorney stated, "[T]he American public . . . is being perpetually inundated with distorted
perceptions of forensic science's capabilities. What ... Hollywood refuse[s] to inform their...
viewers is that while forensic science can effortlessly identify serial offenders it can just as easily
151
inculpate a wholly innocent person."'

The third CSI Effect may, despite the limited attention it has received by scholars and
practitioners, be more valid than the first two. Tom R. Tyler concluded that "whereas media
reports argue that CSI standards make real trial evidence look bad, it is also possible that the
portrayal of science as the ultimate crime-fighting tool actually encourages the already existing
overbelief in the value of the flawed scientific findings that jurors confront in actual trial.,

152

Whether the viewers of CSI are potential jurors or potential suspects, the effect is the same - CSI
153
encourages the myth that forensic science is infallible.

C.

150

The Power ofDNA Evidence

In fact, discovery of human error in crime labs in both Texas and West Virginia resulted in the overturning of

many convictions that were based on the testimony of the forensic pathologist. See In re Investigation of the West
Virginia State Police Crime Laboratory, Serology Division, 438 S.E.2d 501 (W. Va. 1993) (detailing the misconduct
of state serologist Fred Zain); Adam Liptak, Houston DNA Review Clears Convicted Rapist, and Ripples in Texas
Could Be Vast, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2003, at A14 (recounting the exoneration of Josiah Sutton, due to problems in
the Houston crime lab). Liptak reported that,
Legal experts say the laboratory [in Houston] is the worst in the country, but troubles there are
also seen in other crime laboratories. Standards are often lax or nonexistent, technicians are poorly
trained, and defense lawyers often have no money to hire their own experts. Questions about the
work of laboratories and their technicians in Oklahoma City, Montana and Washington State and
elsewhere have led to similar reviews. But the possible problems in Houston are much greater.
More defendants from Harris County, of which Houston is a part, have been executed than from
any other county in the country.
Id.
151

See Cooley, supra note 141, at 388
supra note 136, at 1071.

152 Tyler,

1' See Tyler, supra note 136, at 1072.
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Current confession law permits police to use deception, including deception regarding
DNA evidence, in order to obtain an incriminating statement from a suspect. While the majority
of suspects who confess following the use of such a method are actually guilty, the perception of
infallibility of DNA evidence can have dangerous implications for the factually innocent. 154 It is
155
this uniqueness that makes DNA an invaluable tool for identification.

DNA, or deoxyribonucleic acid, is a distinctive genetic material found in each
individual.' 56 The United Kingdom began using DNA in criminal investigations in the 1980's
and it was quickly adopted by law enforcement in the United States. 157 As explained above, the
introduction of DNA into the world of criminal law has garnered significant attention such that
158
DNA evidence is "generally trusted as being a key to solving criminal cases."

D.

The Needfor Reform
False confessions usually occur when a suspect believes that police have amassed

159
irrefutable evidence against him, such that continuing to maintain his innocence is futile.

Police frequently use fabrication of evidence as a method that is designed, not to make a suspect
falsely confess, but to convince a suspect they believe to be guilty to make an incriminating

154

See White, supra note 6, at 1243.

115See Robert W. Schumacher II, Expanding New York's DNA Database: The Future of Law Enforcement, 26

FoRDmHAm URB. L.J. 1635, 1635 (1999) (explaining DNA technology).
156 Jerilyn Stanley, DNA: Law Enforcement's Miracle of Technology: The Missing Link to Truth and Justice, 32

MCGEORGE L. REV. 601, 601 (2001).
157

See Mark A. Rothstein & Sandra Carnahan, Legal and Policy Issues in Expanding the Scope of Law Enforcement

DNA Data Banks, 67 BROOK. L. REv. 127, 127 (2001). DNA first was introduced at trial in 1988 and used to

convict an Orlando man of rape. See Andrews v. State, 533 So. 2d 841, 850 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
158
Borenstein, supra note 8, at 849.
159 See discussion supra Part III.B. 1.
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False evidence ploys that are based on science or forensics leave a suspect with

limited opportunity to counter. 16 1 For example, in one interrogation, the investigator stated,
"[T]he DNA doesn't lie. That's the only thing that doesn't lie.'

162

However, fabricating DNA

evidence in a police interrogation is a "troubling development considering how much a
misleading DNA test could potentially influence a suspect's behavior." 163 The CSI Effect
indicates that, because television is so influential, viewers are likely to internalize the lessons
they learn and fail to separate them out as fictional when it comes to making real-life
judgments. 164 It is therefore possible that an innocent suspect who believes that DNA evidence
is infallible and that false confessions do occur-perhaps on knowledge based on the mediawill see a false confession as the only way to help himself in the face of irrefutable evidence and
an imperfect justice system.
The possibility of an interrogation-induced false confession runs contrary to the purpose
and function of the justice system: to separate the factually innocent from the factually guilty.
Indeed, a false confession has ramifications for the defendant from the bail hearing to the
sentencing. 165 As the Central Park Jogger case illustrates, "once a jury is exposed to a confession
of guilt it is difficult for jurors to put it aside, even when it is uncorroborated or flatly

160Leo, supra note 84, at 279. Out of 182 interrogations, ninety percent of the time detectives began the interview
by telling the suspect about evidence against him and then said that it was in the suspect's best interests to confess.
In thirty percent of these cases, that evidence was false. Id.
161

Ofshe & Leo, supra note 1, at 1031.

162

Id. (quoting Interrogation Transcript of Stephen Lamont Williams, San Mateo County, Cal., Sheriffs Detective

Bureau Office 53 (July 6, 1992)).
163Borenstein,
164

supra note 8, at 851.

See discussion supra Part IV.

165See

Ofshe & Leo, supranote 1, at 984.
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contradicted by other evidence."' 166 Yet the purpose of the criminal justice process is to seek out
and punish those who are truly responsible for a crime. In order to prevent a false confession
and subsequent wrongful conviction, reform is justified even if it is only designed to protect
those who are especially vulnerable, such as juveniles and the mentally impaired. 167 Because of
the occurrence of false confessions, and the media's reinforcement of the public perception of
DNA infallibility, police should be prohibited from fabricating DNA evidence during
interrogations.
E.

The Benefits of a Per Se Ban on FabricationofDNA Evidence During an Interrogation
Interrogation law, particularly the rule regarding voluntariness, is a "vital and

perplexing" component of the criminal justice system. 168 The Supreme Court itself recognized
the complexities of the totality of the circumstances test. 169 A bright-line rule, such as the
prohibition on the use of physical force during interrogations, 170 provides law enforcement
officers with clear guidance. 17 1 As an FBI trainer put it, "[W]ithout clear rules, the police will
have no reliable idea of what they may do, [and] mistakes will be made."' 172 A judicially or
legislatively created rule barring the use of fabricated evidence of DNA sends a clear and easily
applicable message to law enforcement.

166Davies, supra note 25, at 253.
167

See Davies, supra note 25, at 229 (noting that juveniles are particularly susceptible to interrogation methods).

168Marcus,
169
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See supranote 65 and accompanying text.
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172 Id
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Although the totality of the circumstances test usually does not consider one factor as
dispositive of voluntariness, 173 this proposal fits within the parameters of modem confession law.
Specifically, the Court has focused on government action that will overbear the defendant's will
such that he is no longer capable of free choice. 174 As discussed above, the implication that the
government has DNA evidence against a suspect, especially a suspect who is particularly
vulnerable to interrogation methods, may overbear that suspect's will to maintain his
17 6
innocence. 175 Moreover, because this area of law is best served by applying a bright-line rule,

a universal determination that the influence of false DNA evidence compromises the selfincrimination clause is both permissible and appropriate.
Critics to reforms in police interrogation and confession law caution against "lost
confessions," which are truthful confessions from guilty suspects. 177 The concern is that reforms
to the interrogation methods would, if adopted, decrease the number of truthful confessions
178
rather than false confessions, allowing guilty individuals to remain free to re-offend.

However, over the last thirty years, detectives have become increasingly successful in obtaining
incriminating statements from suspects. 179 Just as the advent of the Miranda warnings has not
proven to be the great barrier to obtaining confessions that it was feared to be by law

173
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See id at 157.

175 See discussion supra Part III.
176 Godsey, supra note 29, at 502.
177

Cassell, supra note 12, at 538 ("[s]ound public policy can be made only be considering countervailing

considerations which argue against greater restrictions on police questioning techniques, e.g., lost confessions."); see
also Magid, supra note 31.
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Davies, supra note 25, at 252.

179 Leo, supranote 84, at 302.
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enforcement, 18 a simple reform in interrogation methods such as this proposal is unlikely to
limit an interrogator's ability to obtain an incriminating statement from a truly guilty suspect.
V. CONCLUSION

DNA testing and its transformation of criminal investigation has received so much
attention by the media that even those who are unfamiliar with scientific advancements know
about DNA and associate it with conclusive, unassailable evidence of guilt.'18

Moreover, the

persistent message that DNA is the infallible key to conviction or freedom-either through
television shows such as CSI or reports on Innocence Project exonerations-reinforces the idea
that DNA is foolproof 18 2 While DNA is usually the champion of the innocent, it can have
dangerous repercussions when police tell innocent suspects that they found DNA evidence
connecting the suspect to a crime.
False confessions occur as a result of highly effective interrogation methods, mostly
because the suspect believes that he has no other choice than to confess. 183 Yet, because this
type of false confession is elicited by methods that are not considered coercive or fundamentally
18 4
unfair by the courts, the law does not offer protection against their admission into evidence.

Thus, when standard interrogation methods are not found to be legally coercive or fundamentally
unfair, the Fourteenth Amendment totality of the circumstances test does not provide any
180
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protection against the admission of false confessions. 185 The reality is that because jurors are
likely to convict on a confession, even those controverted by physical evidence, police
procedures that are likely to produce false confessions violate the government's fundamental
commitment to protect the innocent. 186 Therefore, judicially or legislatively created rules that
seek to decrease false confessions, such as this proposal to prohibit the use of fabricated DNA
evidence in interrogations, are necessary to maintaining a valid and accurate criminal justice
system.
Although opponents of reforms such as this proposal are concerned that law enforcement
would be hindered in their efforts to convict the truly guilty, studies indicates that detectives
would still be able to obtain confessions in the majority of their cases, even without using
interrogation methods that are likely to produce false confessions. 187

Moreover, in most

contexts, the harm to society produced by a false confession outweighs the potential value of a
true confession. 188 A false confession and subsequent wrongful conviction punishes an innocent
person, leaves the true perpetrator free to re-offend, and undermines public confidence in law
enforcement. 189 In short, there is little to lose and much to gain from prohibiting the use of
fabricated DNA evidence in police interrogations, so that the innocents who are most vulnerable
to interrogation methods do not find themselves the victim of a system designed to protect them.

185
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